Inefficient public provision in a repeated elections model by Casamatta, Georges & De Paoli, Caroline
INEFFICIENT PUBLIC PROVISION IN A REPEATED
ELECTIONS MODEL
GEORGES CASAMATTA
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS) and CEPR
CAROLINE DE PAOLI
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ)
Abstract
We consider a dynamic setting with no policy commitment.
Two parties that compete for election must choose the level
of provision of a public good as well as the tax payment
needed to finance it. The cost of producing the good may
be high or low and this information is not known to the
voters. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the
party that does not want much of the public good uses the
inefficient (high cost) technology even though the efficient
one is available. Using the low cost technology would, by
informing the voters about the cost parameter, force it to
produce an excessively high level of the good in the future.
Interestingly, this equilibrium is not symmetric, suggesting
that a party with a strong taste for the public good is less
likely to adopt a wasteful policy.
1. Introduction
The central question addressed in this paper is whether democracies produce
efficient policies.
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According to the Chicago school of political economy, which ideas are
summarized in Wittman (1989), the answer to this question is in the affirma-
tive. The argument is simple and powerful: a politician adopting an inefficient
policy would be voted out of office and replaced by a challenger.
While this argument is compelling, it misses an important point: the voters
may not be perfectly informed about some characteristics of the policy and/or
of the politicians. This view is associated with the Virginia school of political
economy. Coate and Morris (1995) develop in an important paper a model
along these lines. They show that a“bad” incumbent politician may adopt
an inefficient policy because it consists in a disguised transfer to a special
interest. Hidden transfers to special interest groups, although inefficient,
are preferable for politicians who care about their reputation; a direct cash
transfer to the special interest would indeed inform the citizens about the
type of the incumbent politician.
Another issue that has been neglected until recently is the issue of policy
commitment, as emphasized by Acemoglu (2003). When politicians are not
able to commit to future policies, they may have some incentives to adopt
inefficient policies today.
The conclusion that economic choices may be inefficient is in line with
recent empirical evidence that points to the fact that“Governments differ
dramatically in quality” (Treisman 2002).1 So there is a widespread agreement
that democratic countries may fail in providing efficiently some goods to
the citizens. Investigating the causes of such failures and determining the
circumstances in which they will arise remains an important issue. Our paper
contributes to a growing theoretical literature which aim is to answering these
questions.
We propose a model characterized both by asymmetric information between
the politicians and the voters and absence of policy commitment. The economy
is the same as in Schultz (1996). A public good is produced at a constant
marginal cost that can be high or low and is only observed by the politician
in power (not by the voters). The provision of this good is financed with a
uniform tax. The voters/citizens differ only according to their valuation for
the public good.
Schultz considers a standard static electoral competition model in which
two parties compete for election (based on the majority rule) and are able
to commit to the policy announced during the campaign: if elected, they
implement the platform announced during the campaign. Those parties are
assumed to be policy motivated. They care about winning office but also about
which policy is implemented.
1Quality is a broader concept than efficiency, it may include aspects such as corruption,
the degree of inequality or political freedom. Treisman adopts a narrow view of quality,
defined as “the extent to which the government provides public goods and services that the
public demands at minimum cost in taxation and regulatory burden” which corresponds
to the efficiency criterion used in this paper.
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He obtains that the electoral equilibrium may be pooling: the parties’
platforms, that consist of quantities of the public good, are the same whether
the cost is low or high. The basic intuition is that parties are unable to credibly
convey the information to the voters. At equilibrium, the two parties propose
the ideal policy of the (uninformed) median voter and are elected with prob-
ability 1/2. Because a small deviation from the equilibrium does not modify
the beliefs of the voters, the deviating party loses with certainty. It follows
that no party should deviate. The author deduces from this result that the
equilibrium is ex ante inefficient: the expected utility of all individuals could
be increased before the true value of the cost is known to the voters. However,
the equilibrium is efficient ex post, in the sense that the elected party chooses
a value of the tax rate that makes the budget constraint binding at the true
cost value.
We depart from Schultz by considering a repeated elections model, based
on Duggan (2000) and Banks and Duggan (2006), in the tradition of polit-
ical agency models developed by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In this
model, elections are infinitely repeated and there is no political campaigning
at all, so that there is no possible policy commitment. In each period, a party has
to choose a policy. At the beginning of the following period, this incumbent
competes in an election against the challenger. The elected party is the one
that receives the most votes (majority rule). The voters’ strategy is assumed to
be retrospective: they vote for the incumbent if and only if the utility generated
by the last policy choice meets a given utility level.
We consider two parties with policy preferences, these preferences be-
ing known to the voters. Party A is not favorable to a large provision of the
public good whereas party B has a strong taste for it. The only source of
asymmetric information is thus the marginal cost of production of the public
good.2
We show that, as soon as the preferences of the parties are sufficiently po-
larized and the discount factor is high enough, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which A adopts a pooling strategy: he implements the same
policy whether the cost is high or low. In other words, A offers the same quan-
tity of public good at the same tax level, whatever the cost. When the cost is
actually low, such a policy entails a waste of resources: more of the good could
be produced at the same tax level. The underlying idea is that if producing
efficiently, party A would inform the voters that the cost is low. It would then
be induced to produce, in all future periods, a quantity of the good which
is too high from its point of view. As soon as this party prefers to remain in
power, it should follow this inefficient pooling strategy. In some sense, this
2This is a notable difference with the work of Coate and Morris in which the voters are
imperfectly informed about both some characteristics of the policy and of the politicians.
These authors argue that such a double uncertainty is necessary to generate some political
inefficiency. Our study clearly contradicts their claim.
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mechanism is thus a political ratchet effect.3 We obtain the interesting additional
result that this equilibrium is not symmetric: party B should not pretend that
the cost is high when it is low. This follows from the fact that when the cost is
low, party B benefits from a higher production at a lower cost. These results
suggest that parties with a strong taste for the public good are less likely to
adopt a wasteful behavior than others.
1.1. Related Literature
Schultz (2002) also considers a setting of asymmetric information coupled
with the absence of policy commitment. However his main concern is differ-
ent from ours: he argues that the nature of asymmetric information (whether
related to the parties’ preferences or to the state of the economy) determines
the political equilibrium and the departure from the median voter’s preferred
policy. We rather focus on the question of inefficiency itself, as determined
jointly by asymmetric information and the absence of commitment.
There are surprisingly few papers that address the question of inefficient
policy-making. Apart from the above cited work by Coate and Morris (1995)
and Acemoglu (2003), the following papers are relevant for our purpose. In
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), the political power of a group depends on
its size. Adopting an inefficient policy (like a price distortion) can then be an
effective way of expanding the size of this group in order to guarantee its fu-
ture political power. The typical example of such a mechanism can be found
in the distortive price support to farmers. Robinson and Verdier (2002) argue
that employment in the public sector is an inefficient way of redistributing in-
come. However, it is politically attractive as it is credible (income transfers are
not), excludable (public goods are not) and reversible (public investments
are not). The articles by Besley and Coate (1998) and Robinson and Torvik
(2005a, b) are more closely related to our analysis. Both emphasize that the
inability for the politicians to commit about future policies can be a source
of inefficiency. In Besley and Coate, the incumbent politician may refrain
from implementing a potentially Pareto improving public project because it
modifies the preferences of the voters and thus distorts the political equilib-
rium in the next period. The argument developed by Robinson and Torvik
(2005b) is that the implementation of an inefficient project ties the voters
to the incumbent politician. If the former want to benefit from this project,
they have to re-elect the incumbent as the challenger would not refinance it.
Therefore implementing this project, even if economically inefficient, is po-
litically attractive as it increases the re-election probability of the incumbent.
It is worth noticing that in this study the absence of commitment is sufficient
3This term was first used to designate the tendency of firms in a centrally planned econ-
omy to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future (see Freixas,
Guesnerie, and Tirole 1985).
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to generate a political inefficiency. This is due to the fact that the policy con-
sidered has long lasting effects; if the voters want to enjoy the benefits from
this policy in the future they have to re-elect the incumbent. In our model, the
policy considered lasts only one period. We show that in this framework, the
absence of policy commitment is not sufficient for the politicians to behave
inefficiently and it must be coupled with asymmetric information.
To summarize, there are two strands of the literature on political ineffi-
ciencies, both building on dynamic models with no policy commitment. In the first
one, the inefficiency comes from the signaling property of the political ac-
tion. The paper by Coate and Morris (1995) and ours belong to this class.
In the other strand of the literature, that encompasses the papers by Besley
and Coate (1998), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Robinson and Verdier
(2002), and Robinson and Torvik (2005a, b), asymmetric information is not
the reason why elected representatives choose inefficient policies. The ex-
planation lies instead in the fact that the political action today has impact
on the political equilibrium tomorrow, this impact not being channeled by
asymmetric information.
We are not aware of papers developing theories of inefficient behavior
by elected politicians, that consider a static framework and/or policy com-
mitment. We conjecture that (i) dynamics and (ii) absence of commitment
are both necessary to explain such a phenomenon. A formal demonstration
of this conjecture is however outside the scope of this paper.
The model is presented in the next section. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted
to the analysis of equilibria.
2. The Model
2.1. Description of the Economy
The economic problem is exactly the same as in Schultz (1996). A quantity x
of a public good is produced.4 The cost of production of x units of the good
is cx where c can take on one of two values: cl or ch with 0 < cl < ch. The
government finances the provision of the public good through a uniform tax
τ .
The citizens are identical in all respects but their valuation for the public
good, θ . The preferences of a type θ individual are described by the following
function:
v(x, τ ; θ) = θu(x) − τ, (1)
where u is increasing and strictly concave; θ is distributed on [θ
¯
, θ¯] according
to a density function f , the median of this distribution being denoted θ m .
4As it should become clear in the following of the section, the public good nature of
government provision is inessential for the derivation of the results. What matters is that
this provision be uniform across all citizens.
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We impose that the budget be balanced each period (no debt is allowed).
Normalizing total population to 1, the government budget constraint is
cx ≤
∫ θ¯
θ
¯
τ f (θ)dθ
⇔ cx ≤ τ.
When cx < τ , there is obviously a waste of resources: with the tax receipts τ ,
a quantity of the good higher than cx could be provided to the citizens.
The optimal policy of individual j in state s ∈ {l , h} will be denoted (xsj ,
τ sj ). This is given by the conditions
θ j u′
(
xsj
) = c s (2)
τ sj = c s xsj . (3)
Equation (2) comes from the first-order conditions on x and τ . Equation (3)
means that individual j’s optimal policy requires a binding budget constraint.
Differentiating these equations, we obtain
dxsj
dcs
= 1
θ j u′′
(
xsj
) < 0 (4)
and
dτ sj
dcs
= xsj + c s
dxsj
dcs
= xsj + θ j u′
(
xsj
) 1
θ j u′′
(
xsj
)
< 0 iff E
(
xsj
) = −xsj u′′
(
xsj
)
u′
(
xsj
) < 1.
We will assume in the following that E(x), the elasticity of the marginal utility
of consumption, is always lower than 1. This implies that the optimal tax
level of any individual increases when the marginal cost decreases. We further
make the simplifying assumption that this coefficient is constant, considering
an isoelastic utility function:
u(x) = x
1−ε
1 − ε ,
where E (x) = ε ≤ 1.
2.2. The Political Game
There are two parties/politicians A and B with policy preferences θ A and θB such
that θ A < θ m < θB . Party A represents individuals with a moderate taste for
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the public good whereas party B’s constituency favors a high provision of this
good. The players of this game are thus the two parties and the voters. There
is asymmetric information among these players. The marginal cost c is constant
across periods.5 It is revealed to a party as soon as it takes office6 whereas
voters are initially uninformed. Their prior belief is that the cost is high with
probability µ0. They may or may not learn the true value of the cost later on,
depending on the equilibrium path of play.
2.2.1. Timing
Building on Duggan (2000) and Banks and Duggan (2006), we study a repeated
elections model with infinite horizon. At the beginning of each period t, an election
takes place in which the voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent party
or to appoint the challenger. The elected politician is the one who receives
most votes (majority rule).7 He then chooses a policy for the current period
(xt , τ t). In the following period t + 1, the same sequence of events occurs
again.
The history at date t, ht , describes the publicly observed events in the first
t periods, namely the party in power and the policy chosen in each period.
One important feature of this model is that there is no campaign stage
and thus no policy announcements. The parties are not able to commit before
the election to the policy they would implement if elected. This contrasts with
most of the election models developed insofar, that belongs to the Downsian
tradition. The model we build upon (Schultz 1996) is not an exception.
Another important difference between Schultz and our analysis is that
in our study the policy space is composed of both the public good level and
the tax needed to finance it. In Schultz, electoral competition only takes
place on the quantity of the public good provided by the state; the tax rate
is adjusted ex post (after the election) so as to satisfy the government budget
constraint. In such a setting, the public good allocation is necessarily (ex post)
5Our results and the main messages of the model do not change if we assume that the cost
is variable but there is some persistence across periods. However, we make the assumption
that c is constant for simplicity.
6In the equilibria we consider, the party initially in power remains in power forever. There-
fore, the challenger never observes the true value of the marginal cost. Observe that our
results would remain valid if we had assumed that the challenger was informed about the
value of the marginal cost but was not able to communicate it to the voters. The case in
which the challenger is informed and communication with the electorate is possible is
more complicated and lies outside the scope of this paper.
7We assume that when the two parties receive the same number of votes, the incumbent
politician is re-elected for sure. In the equilibria described below, the incumbent and the
challenger will always be tying. This comes however from our assumption that there is a
continuum of types. With a finite number of types, such a case would occur only when
the proportion of individuals having a valuation for the public good lower or equal to the
median is exactly 1/2.
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Pareto efficient.8 What would happen if one were to consider a model with
commitment, as in Schultz, but with both the public good level and the tax rate
announced during the campaign stage? We argue that the outcome would
also be Pareto efficient. The argument is straightforward. Suppose that both
parties propose wasteful policies, that is they pretend that the cost is high when
it is in fact low. Clearly the two parties should deviate towards a policy that
is feasible only in the low cost state and that makes half the total population
better off. Doing so, their probability of being elected would jump from 0
to 1. As a consequence the no commitment assumption is necessary to obtain our
inefficiency result.9 We will see later that it is not sufficient alone and that
it must coupled with asymmetric information for that result to hold (see
Proposition 1).10
2.2.2. Payoffs
The voters: Type θ voter’s payoff from the sequence {xt , τ t} of policy outcomes
is the discounted sum of per period utility levels:
(1 − δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1v(xt , τt ; θ),
where δ < 1 is the time discount factor.
The parties: Party i’s (i = {A, B}) payoff from the sequence {xt , τ t} of outcomes
is:
(1 − δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1 [v(xt , τt ; θ) + βωi (It )] ,
where ω i(I t) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if and only if I t = i ,
i = A, B. The parties have therefore some preferences on the policy
implemented in each period, but they also value the fact of holding office,
deriving a utility level β in such a case.
8In Schultz’s paper as well as in ours, the efficiency criterion is constrained Pareto optimality,
i.e., given the instruments available to the policymaker. In particular, we do not consider side
transfers between the players. This means that a public good allocation will not, except in
the particular case where it corresponds to the optimal choice of the mean valuation type,
satisfy the Bowen–Lindahl–Samuelson rule. In order to be optimal, it must simply lie on
the boundary of the budget set. Any allocation in the interior of the budget set entails a
waste of resources and is thus Pareto dominated.
9We have established that the commitment assumption in the static game generates an
efficient policy choice. It is still possible that an inefficient choice emerges in a repeated
elections context in which at each period the two parties compete for election and are able
to commit to the policy implemented if elected (see Duggan and Fey 2006 for a formal
treatment of this game in the complete information case).
10The reader may wonder if an inefficient policy could arise as an equilibrium of a static
game without commitment. It is easily shown that it is not possible: once elected, the
politician in power has no incentive to waste resources, he simply chooses the optimal
policy from his point of view.
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2.2.3. Strategies
The parties: A (pure) strategy of party i specifies the policy chosen pi,t = (xi,t ,
τ i,t) if elected in period t. It is a function of history at date t − 1, ht−1, and of
the state of the world s ∈ {l , h}.
The voters: A (pure) strategy of voter j specifies, for every possible history at
date t − 1, ht−1, the action chosen in period t, aj,t ∈ {I , C}, where a j,t = I (resp.
C) means that this individual votes for the incumbent (resp. challenger). We
consider voting strategies that are retrospective: each voter decides to vote for
the incumbent if and only if the utility generated by its last policy choice is at
least equal to a given threshold level V¯ . Formally,
a j,t = I iff v(xt−1, τt−1; θ j ) ≥ V¯ j,t . (5)
In the equilibria studied in the following sections, V¯ is assumed to be equal
to the expected continuation value of electing the challenger.
2.2.4. Beliefs
The party in power is perfectly informed about the state of the world. Initial
beliefs of the voters are given by µ0 (probability that the cost is high). These
beliefs are updated at the end of each period following the policy choice of
the incumbent politician: µt = µ(ht−1). As usual, these beliefs are updated
according to Bayes rule whenever possible, that is following an equilibrium
play.
Out of equilibrium beliefs are assumed to be the following. When the voters
observe a policy choice on or below the high cost frontier, that is a choice
which is feasible in both states of the world, they do not modify their beliefs.
Conversely, a policy choice outside this frontier is necessarily informative
because it is only feasible in the low cost state. Whenever they observe such
a play, the voters conclude that the cost of production of the public good is
low.
3. Political Equilibria
As one can guess, there are a lot of possible equilibria in this repeated game
setting. We will restrict our attention to strategies that are stationary, except
possibly with respect to the beliefs of the voters. In other words we will consider
Markov perfect equilibria with the beliefs of the voters as the state variable.
This means that the re-election rule of the voters and the policy choice of the
incumbent will remain unchanged as soon as the beliefs are not modified.
Additionally, we will consider equilibria such that the party initially in power
remains in office forever and always chooses the same policy (xei , τ
e
i ) on the
equilibrium path. In these equilibria, called Equilibria with Policy Persistence
(EPP), the following lemma holds.
1112 Journal of Public Economic Theory
LEMMA 1: Median decisiveness
In any EPP, the incumbent politician is re-elected if and only if the median type
individual votes for him.
Proof : See Appendix.
The median type individual will be called the median voter in the remain-
der of the paper. This lemma is very useful as it allows us, on the voters’ side,
to consider only the strategy of the median voter. In other words, the game
can be reduced to a game between three players: party A, party B and the
median voter.
3.1. Complete Information
Before presenting equilibria with asymmetric information, we show that the
policy chosen under complete information is efficient.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that the voters are perfectly informed about the value of
the marginal cost. Then the policy choice in any given period is Pareto-optimal.
Proof : Suppose that in a given period, the incumbent chooses a Pareto dom-
inated policy. If this policy does not satisfy the re-election rule of the
median voter, the incumbent can still implement a policy that yields a
higher utility for himself whether it leads to re-election or not. If the
policy considered satisfies the re-election threshold, there exist poli-
cies that still meet this threshold and generate a higher utility for the
incumbent. 
This proposition implies that asymmetric information is a necessary condition
in our setting to have some political inefficiencies. This contrasts with papers such as
Robinson and Torvik (2005a, b) in which the absence of commitment alone
is sufficient for such a result to hold. As explained in the introduction this
is due to the long lasting nature of the policy they consider: in their model
it takes two periods for a project to yield some benefits. If the voters want
to enjoy these benefits they have to re-elect the incumbent politician. The
mechanism we identify is quite different. It relies on the interaction between
the absence of policy commitment and asymmetric information.
3.2. Inefficient Equilibrium
We now turn to the main result of the paper, that is the possibility of obtaining
an equilibrium in which a politician chooses a Pareto dominated policy.
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3.2.1. Intuitive Description of the Equilibrium
Before formally demonstrating it, we provide the reader with an intuitive
explanation of our main result. The equilibrium we identify works as follows.
Initially, party A is in power. It adopts a pooling strategy, which implies
that the policy chosen is not informative to the voters, it is the same whether
the cost is high or low.
The (uninformed) median voter is indifferent between this policy and
the one that B would implement if elected. This latter policy is separating
(and hence would reveal the true value of the cost to the voters) and consists
in B proposing its optimal policy in both states of the world. The median voter
being indifferent, he chooses to re-elect the incumbent politician following
our assumptions on the voting behavior. It is worth emphasizing that he has no
incentive whatsoever to experiment and elect the challenger , even though he would
learn the true value of the cost by electing party B: his expected utility is the
same whether he votes for the incumbent or the challenger.
In the second period, the party in office is A. Because its first period policy
choice was not informative, the beliefs of the voters are unchanged. As we
consider Markov strategies with beliefs as the state variable, the policy choice
by A in the second period remains the same and the argument developed
previously still applies. The process then repeats forever: A always remains in
power and adopts the same policy.
We have argued that the strategy of the median voter is optimal. We
also have to check that the strategies of the parties are optimal. Under this
strategy, A is re-elected in all periods. Is it optimal for A? Could not it prefer to
deviate to a preferred policy, even though this entails foregoing the benefits
of re-election?11 We consider a discount factor sufficiently large so that this
is not the case, that is such that A wants primarily to be re-elected. Then the
question is why A shouldn’t want to deviate in the low cost state and propose
a more efficient policy. The answer is simply that it would reveal to the voters
that the cost is low. These latter would then require that A provides them with
a utility level as least as high as the one proposed by B in the low cost state.
We give conditions on the preferences of the parties such that A is not willing
to do so: A prefers to pretend that the cost is high and implement a policy
which is more in line with its preferences.
So far, we have thus shown informally that a situation in which party A
plays a pooling strategy, and thus wastes resources in the low cost state, can be
an equilibrium. The last thing we need to check is whether this equilibrium
is subgame perfect. In other words, we have to make sure that the strategies
of the parties and the voters are optimal on paths out the equilibrium. In
this purpose, we have to verify first that B should not deviate if elected and
11These benefits are twofold. First, they consist in the exogenous benefit β of being in
office. Second, being in office allows the party to choose the policy. If the party were to
abandon power, it would have to leave this choice to the challenger and would have to bear
a less preferred policy.
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second that A’s strategy would be optimal if this party were to be re-elected
after B, that is with the voters being perfectly informed (recall that B’s strategy
is revealing).
The important point is that A’s strategy is modified when the voters be-
come informed about the cost. In such a case, A proposes the best possible
policy from its point of view under the constraint that it makes the median
voter indifferent between this policy and the one proposed by B in each state
of the world. This policy is separating and it ensures re-election for A in both
states of the world. It is thus optimal as soon as the discount factor is suffi-
ciently large, which implies that A values re-election a lot. The last question
is whether B’s strategy is optimal. Observing that B’s policy guarantees re-
election (the median voter is indifferent between A and B’s policies) and
moreover that it corresponds to the optimal unconstrained choice for B, it is
obvious that B should not deviate.
3.2.2. Formal Argument
Let (x˜A, τ˜A) be the policy such that
θmu(x˜A) − τ˜A = µ0v
(
xhB, τ
h
B ; θm
) + (1 − µ0)v(xlB, τ lB ; θm)
τ˜A = c h x˜A
and (x˜ sA, τ˜
s
A), s = h, l , the policies such that
v
(
xsB, τ
s
B ; θm
) = v(x˜ sA, τ˜ sA; θm)
τ˜ sA = c s x˜sA.
(6)
It should be noted that these policies do not exist for all possible values of
the parameters of the model, θ m , θB , ch, cl , and µ0. However, one can always
find some values for these parameters such that the policies defined above
exist. In particular, for (x˜A, τ˜A) to exist, µ0, the initial probability that the cost
is high, must be large enough.
PROPOSITION 2: Provided that the following necessary and sufficient conditions
are satisfied,
v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA) ≥ v
(
x˜lA, τ˜
l
A; θA
)
(7)
∂x
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
v=v
(
x˜hA,τ˜
h
A ;θA
) ≥ c h (8)
and
δ ≥ max
{
v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) − v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA)
v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) − v(xhB, τ hB ; θA) + β ,
v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) − v(x˜lA, τ˜ lA; θA)
v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) − v(xlB, τ lB ; θA) + β
}
,
(9)
the strategies below constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
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If µt = µ0,
p eA,t (c
h) = p eA,t (c l ) = (x˜A, τ˜A)
p eB,t (c
h) = (xhB, τ hB ); p eB,t (c l ) = (xlB, τ lB)
V¯t = µ0v
(
xhB, τ
h
B ; θm
) + (1 − µ0)v(xlB, τ lB ; θm) = v(x˜A, τ˜A; θm).
If µt = µ0,
p eA,t (c
h) = (x˜hA, τ˜ hA); p eA,t (c l ) = (x˜lA, τ˜ lA)
p eB,t (c
h) = (xhB, τ hB ); p eB,t (c l ) = (xlB, τ lB)
V¯t = µt v
(
xhB, τ
h
B ; θm
) + (1 − µt )v(xlB, τ lB ; θm)
= µt v
(
x˜hA, τ˜
h
A ; θm
) + (1 − µt )v(x˜lA, τ˜ lA; θm).
Proof : Suppose first that A is in power at the beginning of period t.
(1) The beliefs of the voters are the initial beliefs.
The equilibrium play of A is pooling at (x˜A, τ˜A) . The re-election rule
of the (uninformed) median voter, V¯ = v(x˜A, τ˜A; θm), is satisfied so that
A is re-elected. The conditions ensuring that A does not want to give up
re-election in states h and l , respectively, are
v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA) + β ≥ (1 − δ)
[
v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) + β] + δv(xhB, τ hB ; θA)
⇔ δ ≥ v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) − v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA)
v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) − v(xhB, τ hB ; θA) + β (10)
and
v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA) + β ≥ (1 − δ)
[
v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) + β] + δv(xlB, τ lB ; θA)
⇔ δ ≥ v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) − v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA)
v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) − v(xlB, τ lB ; θA) + β . (11)
A deviation by A on or below the high cost frontier is not infor-
mative to the voters (following our specification of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs). Therefore, if A deviates “to the left” (lower τ), he is not re-
elected anymore and accordingly obtains a lower payoff. If he deviates
“to the right”, he is still re-elected but with a less desirable policy if
∂x/∂τ |v=v(x˜A,τ˜A ;θA) ≥ c h . One can easily verify that this condition is im-
plied by (8), so that this deviation is not profitable.
A deviation above the high cost frontier (when feasible) informs the
voters that the cost is low. To be re-elected, A must provide the median
voter with a utility level at least as high as V¯ = v(xlB, τ lB ; θm) = v(x˜lA, τ˜ lA; θA).
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When condition (7) is satisfied, A does not want to make such a
deviation.
(2) When the voters are informed, the pooling strategy is not optimal:
A should deviate in both states of the world. In state l , he is not re-
elected if he sticks to the pooling strategy. In state h, he is re-elected
but could obtain a higher utility level.
The separating strategy described in the proposition is optimal. Whether
the cost is low or high, party A is voted out of office if deviating “to the
left” whereas, under condition (8), a deviation “to the right” allows party
A to be re-elected but yields a lower utility level. Conditions ensuring that
A prefers to be re-elected are
δ ≥ v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) − v(x˜hA, τ˜ hA ; θA)
v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θA
) − v(xhB, τ hB ; θA) + β (12)
and
δ ≥ v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) − v(x˜lA, τ˜ lA; θA)
v
(
xlA, τ
l
A; θA
) − v(xlB, τ lB ; θA) + β . (13)
From (8), v(x˜hA, τ˜
h
A ; θA) > v(x˜A, τ˜A; θA). Therefore (10) implies (12).
Moreover from (7), (13) implies (11). Consequently, the conditions en-
suring that A always prefers to be re-elected are those in (9).
Suppose now that B is in power at the beginning of period t. The
strategy described in the proposition is clearly optimal as B obtains his
optimal policy in both states of the world and is always re-elected.
We finally have to show that condition (7) is possible. The following
lemma, proved in the Appendix, will be useful:
LEMMA 2: For a coefficient of relative risk aversion ε sufficiently close to 1, τ˜ sA is
decreasing with cs .
Let us denote A˜h (resp. A˜l and A˜) the point (x˜hA, τ˜
h
A ) (resp. (x˜
l
A, τ˜
l
A) and
(x˜A, τ˜A)). Let us also denote I hm (resp. I
l
m and I˜m) the indifference curve
for m through A˜h (resp. A˜l and A˜h).
Lemma 2 implies that A˜l lies to the right of A˜h . Therefore I lm lies
above I hm . By construction, I˜m lies between I
h
m and I
l
m so that A˜ must be to
the right of A˜h . Lemma 2 also implies that it is possible that τ˜A < τ˜ lA. As
indifference curves are increasing, this is a necessary condition for the
indifference curve for A through A˜ to be above the indifference curve
for A through A˜l , which is equivalent to condition (7). This condition
is more likely to hold the steeper the indifference curves for A (i.e., the
smaller θ A) and the bigger µ0. 
This equilibrium is represented on Figure 1.
The steeper indifference curve passing through (x˜A, τ˜A) is an indifference
curve of politician A. The indifference curves tangent to the budget frontier
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Figure 1: Inefficient equilibrium
at (xhB , τ
h
B) and (x
l
B , τ
l
B) are indifference curves of politician B. The other
indifference curves represented on this graph are those of the median voter.
The strategy of party B consists in proposing his ideal policy (xsB , τ
s
B) in
state s = h, l . It is separating. Consequently, if B is in power at some point
in time, voters learn the value of the cost. This is not true for A whose policy
choice depends on the voters’ beliefs. When these latter are not informed
(they hold the initial beliefs), A adopts a pooling strategy: he proposes the
same policy (x˜A, τ˜A) in both states of the world. This implies that the policy
choice is inefficient when the cost of production is low as more of the public good
could be produced with the same tax receipts.
The logic underlying this result is that if A adopts an efficient policy when
the cost is low, he reveals this information to the voters. In such a case, the
strategy of B implies that he would choose the policy (xlB , τ
l
B) if elected. In
order to give the median voter a utility level at least equal to v(xlB , τ
l
B ;θ m), A
must select a policy “to the right” of (x˜lA, τ˜
l
A). However, under condition (7)
he is not willing to do so. In other words, even though the good is produced
more efficiently, the increase in production that A must ensure in order to be
re-elected is excessively high given his preferences for the good. Condition (9)
precisely guarantees that A wants to be re-elected. It should be noted that this
may be the case even when the benefit of holding office is 0. The explanation
is straightforward: if A is voted out of office, he will never be re-elected again.
Therefore the policy choice will be the optimal policy of B forever. Even
though there is a short run gain for A due to the implementation of his ideal
policy, there is a long run opportunity cost. When the preference for the
present is not too strong, A prefers to remain in office.
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We have just argued that A does not want to deviate to a more efficient
policy in the low cost state and prefers to stick to the pooling strategy (as
long as the voters are uninformed). For this strategy to be an equilibrium, it
must be also the case that there are no other pooling strategies that make A
better off. Two possible deviations on the high cost budget frontier should
be considered. On the one hand, A could deviate to the left and forego
the benefits of re-election. Under (9), he does not want to do so. On the
other hand, A could deviate to the right and still be re-elected. However,
condition (8) tells us that A is worse-off after this deviation.
What about subgame perfection? Should B be in power at any point
in time, it is re-elected (the median voter is indifferent between A and B’s
policies) and adopts its most preferred unconstrained policy (xsB , τ
s
B) in state
s. It thus should obviously not deviate. Should A be in power with the voters
informed, it is also re-elected with a policy, (xsA, τ
s
A) in state s, that leaves the
median voter indifferent between voting for A and B. As soon as A wants to
be re-elected, which is ensured by (9), it has no better option than this.
We have thus shown that politician A who does not want much of the pub-
lic good may adopt a Pareto dominated policy at the political equilibrium. Is
the converse true? Is it also possible that the party B displaying a high taste for
the public good also adopts an inefficient behavior? Section 4 addresses this
question. Before moving to this section, we consider in the next subsection
other possible equilibria.
3.3. Other Equilibria
As one can imagine, there is large number of equilibria in this infinitely re-
peated game and we will not attempt to describe all of them. We may however
be interested in knowing if there exist equilibria in which both parties adopt
a revealing strategy, implying an efficient level of the publicly provided good.
If we consider equilibria in which B proposed his optimal policy, as in Propo-
sition 2, the answer is no under the conditions stated in this proposition. If
A were to play a separating strategy, the policy adopted by A is state s should
necessarily be (x˜ sA, τ˜
s
A). Otherwise, it could not be re-elected (and, by condi-
tion (9), we assume a discount factor sufficiently large such that A wants to
be re-elected). But then, condition (7) implies that A should deviate in the
low cost state: he should pretend that the cost is high whenever it is low.
Therefore, the equilibrium in which party B proposes its optimal policy in both
states of the world and A plays a separating strategy does not exist under the condi-
tions stated in Proposition 2. One could however envisage situations in which
B plays a different strategy. For example one could consider an equilibrium
in which A proposes its optimal policy contingent on the state of the world
and B plays a separating strategy such that the median voter is indifferent
between A and B’s policies in both states of the world. One can prove that
such an equilibrium exists as soon as the valuation for the public good of
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party B is sufficiently high enough compared to the valuation of the median
voter.
Therefore a fully revealing (and thus efficient) equilibrium exists when
the preferences of B and the median voter are sufficiently far apart. What
happens if the preferences of the median voter and politician B are very
aligned? When the valuation of A is sufficiently low and the voters puts a
large probability on the cost being high, the only possible equilibrium involves a
pooling behavior by A. Under these conditions, the policy proposed by B should
be close to the optimal policy of the median voter (it is necessarily between
the optimal policy of B and the median voter). Consequently, A should not
deviate from the pooling strategy as doing so he would be forced to provide
the preferred public good level of the median voter in the low cost state, which
is excessive from his point of view.12 There thus exist circumstances in which the
only possible equilibria are inefficient.
As a concluding comment, observe that there are also cases in which there
is no equilibrium with policy persistence, either separating or not. This occurs
when the preferences of B and the median voter are close enough and the
valuation of A low enough. Moreover, the voters should place a non negligible
probability on the cost being low. In these circumstances, if A plays pooling,
he is not re-elected as the median voter strictly prefers the policy proposed by
B. On the other hand, a separating strategy by A is not optimal for the reasons
by now familiar that A should misreport the value of the marginal cost.
4. Not All Parties Behave Inefficiently
We show in the next proposition that the equilibrium symmetric to the one
in Proposition 2, in which A always proposes his optimal public good level
and B plays pooling, does not exist.
PROPOSITION 3: Strategies symmetric to the ones presented in Proposition 2 do not
constitute an equilibrium.
Proof : See Appendix.
Such an equilibrium would require that party A chose his preferred pol-
icy in the two states of nature. On the other side, party B would pick up
a pooling policy until voters are informed about the cost. Symmetrically to
12Note incidentally that, for the same reasons, an equilibrium in which both parties im-
plement the optimal policy of the median voter, which would be a kind of median voter
theorem result, does not exit when A has a very low valuation for the public good. This
latter would have an incentive to deviate from this separating strategy so as to avoid too
large a provision of the public good.
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what happened with Proposition 2, we would have the following equilibrium
strategies:
If µt = µ0,
p eB,t (c
h) = p eB,t (c l ) = (x˜B, τ˜B)
p eA,t (c
h) = (xhA, τ hA); p eA,t (c l ) = (xlA, τ lA)
V¯t = µ0v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θm
) + (1 − µ0)v(xlA, τ lA; θm) = v(x˜B, τ˜B ; θm).
If µt = µ0,
p eB,t (c
h) = (x˜hB, τ˜ hB ); p eB,t (c l ) = (x˜lB, τ˜ lB)
p eA,t (c
h) = (xhA, τ hA); p eA,t (c l ) = (xlA, τ lA)
V¯t = µt v
(
xhA, τ
h
A ; θm
) + (1 − µt )v(xlA, τ lA; θm)
= µt v
(
x˜hB, τ˜
h
B ; θm
) + (1 − µt )v(x˜lB, τ˜ lB ; θm).
These strategies are represented on Figure A1 in the Appendix.
We show that it is never optimal for B to offer the pooling policy when the
cost is low so that the previous strategies cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
The idea underlying this result is that when A plays his optimal policy in each
state of the world, B should deviate from the pooling strategy in the low cost
state, proposing a policy that entails more public good provision at a lower
cost and leaving the median voter indifferent between this policy and A’s
optimal policy, therefore guaranteeing re-election for B.
This result means that there is a fundamental asymmetry between the
parties in the sense that the party with a low taste for the public good is more
likely to select inefficient policies. However, this does not mean that there
is no equilibrium in which the party with a strong taste for the public good
wastes resources. The existence of an equilibrium with B adopting a pooling
strategy is still a possibility.
5. Concluding Comments
We have shown that a party in power may prefer to supply a low quantity
of a public good when more could be produced at the same tax level. This
is clearly a wasteful behavior. The reason for such a behavior is that if the
median voter were informed that the cost of production is low, he would ask
for a larger provision of the good, against the interests of the party with a
low taste for the public good. In other words, our analysis suggests that a
party opposed to an excessive state intervention has very weak incentives to
promote an efficient provision of goods by the public sector. Observing that
the state performs well in providing such goods, the voters would urge the
party in power to develop public provision.
This also suggests that when a party with a strong taste for the public good
is in power, the policy adopted is less likely to involve a waste of resources.
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Proposition 3 proves that this intuition is correct. However, it relies very much
on a technological asymmetry of the model: because the budget is balanced
each period, the set of feasible policies expands when the cost decreases. This
implies that a party can pretend that the cost is high when it is low but not
the converse. Allowing some debt would restore some symmetry. However, as
soon as debt is observable, it still does not allow a party to pretend that the
cost is lower than it really is.
Our argument is built on the combination of three assumptions: asym-
metric information, absence of commitment and repeated elections. All these
three assumptions are needed for our results. As argued before, other papers
developed theories of inefficient political decision-making in a dynamic set-
ting without commitment but with complete information (Besley and Coate
1998, Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Robinson and Torvik 2005a, b). In our
setting, asymmetric information is necessary to obtain inefficiency. This dif-
ference stems from the fact that in all these papers, the choice made by a
politician in a given period has an impact on the political equilibrium in sub-
sequent periods, which is not channeled through asymmetric information.
Because the politicians are unable to commit to the future policies, they may
have incentives to distort policies in the current period so as to generate more
favorable outcomes in the future. As a conclusion, asymmetric information is not
in general necessary to have political inefficiencies. On the other hand, we are
not aware of elections models that yields inefficiencies in a static framework
(with or without policy commitment) or in a dynamic framework with pol-
icy commitment. This suggests that the assumptions of no commitment and
of a dynamic political process are necessary for the political equilibrium to
be inefficient. While this conclusion is true in our framework, its generaliza-
tion lies outside the scope of this paper and should be the object of future
research.
Our paper is very close in spirit to Coate and Morris (1995) who consider
a dynamic model with no commitment and asymmetric information. The
mechanism through which politicians deliver an inefficient policy is however
different. In their model, politicians, by implementing the efficient action,
reveal information about their type. A “bad” politician who cares about some
special interest and not only about the general public incurs the risk of not be-
ing re-elected if detected by the voters. He may then prefer to use disguised
transfers to special interests even though it results in a Pareto dominated
policy. In our model, information with respect to the type of the politicians
is public and the “risk” that politicians face when disclosing information to
the electorate is to be forced to implement a policy that they dislike. There-
fore, their argument is based on reputational concerns whereas our can be
interpreted as a ratchet effect.
Formally, an important difference between the two models is that they
need a double uncertainty, both on the type of the politicians and of the
policies to be selected by them, whereas we only have asymmetric information
with respect to the type of the policy. The “price” of this simplification is that
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we need to consider and infinitely repeated elections model when they only
need two periods.
Lastly, a few words concerning the nature of the political inefficiency are
in order. A possible interpretation of this inefficiency is that the politician in
power collects more money than needed and “burns” the unused amount.
While this is of course an unrealistic feature of the model, it captures the in-
centives faced by elected policy makers. A proper framework should allow the
politicians to “steal” public money and use it for their own personal consump-
tion, which is not the case in our modeling. We guess that introducing such a
possibility would in fact reinforce our main result as it represents an additional
motive for the politician to pretend that the technology is inefficient.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: This lemma follows directly from the single crossing prop-
erty of individuals’ preferences. From (1), the slope of an indifference
curve
dx
dτ
= 1
θu′(x)
is decreasing with θ . This implies that the indifference curves cross only
once.
In any given period t, the continuation value from electing party i
for a type θ individual is
(1 − δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1v
(
xei , τ
e
i ; θ
) = v(xei , τ ei ; θ).
Let us denote −i the alternative party to party i. If v(xei , τ ei ; θ) > v(xe −i ,
τ e−i ; θ), individual θ , who behaves as pivotal, should vote for party i. In case
of equality, consistency with the retrospective voting behavior described
in (5) requires that this individual votes for the incumbent.
Consider now the case xeA < x
e
B . If v(x
e
A, τ
e
A; θ m) > v(x
e
B , τ
e
B ; θ m), the
median type votes for A. The single crossing property implies that v(xeA,
τ eA; θ) > v(x
e
B , τ
e
B ; θ) ∀θ < θ m and therefore that these individuals also
vote for A. Therefore if A is the incumbent, he is re-elected. If B is the
incumbent he is voted out of office. When v(xeA, τ
e
A; θ m) = v(xeB , τ eB ; θ m),
each party receives half of the votes and the incumbent is re-elected by
assumption (see footnote 7). If v(xeA, τ
e
A; θ m) < v(x
e
B , τ
e
B ; θ m), the median
type votes for B. The single crossing property implies that v(xeB , τ
e
B ; θ) >
v(xeA, τ
e
A; θ) ∀θ > θ m and therefore that these individuals also vote for B.
Therefore if B is the incumbent, he is re-elected. If A is the incumbent,
he is voted out of office. When v(xeA, τ
e
A; θ m) = v(xeB , τ eB ; θ m), each party
receives half of the votes and the incumbent is re-elected by assumption.
The analysis in the case xeA > x
e
B is similar. When x
e
A = xeB and τ eA =
τ eB , all the citizens vote for the party proposing the lower tax rate. Finally,
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when xeA = xeB and τ eA = τ eB , they are all indifferent between the two
parties. 
Proof of Lemma 2: We remove in this proof the superscript denoting the state
of the world. From (6), x˜A is implicitly defined by the following equation:
θmu(x˜A) − c x˜A − θmu(xB) + cxB = 0, (A1)
where xB satisfies the first-order condition c = θBu′(x B).
Differentiating equation (A1) with respect to c, we obtain
dx˜A
dc
=
x˜A + θm dxBdc u
′ (xB) − xB − c dxBdc
θmu′ (x˜A) − c .
Differentiating τ˜A = c x˜A and recalling that u(x) = x1−ε/(1 − ε), we get
d τ˜A
dc
= x˜A + c d x˜Adc
=
x˜Aθmu′(x˜A) − xBθBu′(xB) − xB
ε
u′(xB)(θm − θB)
θmu′(x˜A) − c .
The denominator is positive. We thus have to check that the numerator,
denoted N , is negative.
N = xBu′(xB)
[
θm
x˜Au′ (x˜A)
xBu′ (xB)
− θB − θm − θB
ε
]
.
Observing that
x˜Au′(x˜A)
xBu′(xB)
= u(x˜A)
u(xB)
,
we have that N < 0 if and only if
u (x˜A)
u (xB)
<
θB (ε − 1) + θm
εθm
.
From (A1),
u (x˜A)
u (xB)
= θB
θm
(1 − ε)
(
x˜A
xB
− 1
)
+ 1.
Therefore the previous inequality is satisfied if and only if
x˜A
xB
<
θm − θB
εθB
+ 1.
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From the strict concavity of u, u(xB) − u(x˜A) < u′(x˜A)(xB − x˜A). Rear-
ranging (A1), we obtain
u(xB) − u(x˜A) = c(xB − x˜A)
θm
< u′(x˜A)(xB − x˜A)
⇔ u
′(x˜A)
u′(xB)
>
θB
θm
⇔ x˜A
xB
<
(
θm
θB
)1/ε
.
Observing that
lim
ε→1
θm − θB
εθB
+ 1 = lim
ε→1
(
θm
θB
)1/ε
= θm
θB
,
and since (θ m − θB)/εθB is continuous in ε, we have that x˜A/xB < (θm −
θB)/εθB + 1 for ε sufficiently close to 1 and therefore that d τ˜A/dc < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3: In order to prove Proposition 3, we use the following
lemma:
LEMMA 3: x˜ sB decreases when c
s increases, where x˜sB is implicitly defined by the
equation
θmu
(
x˜ sB
) − c s x˜sB − θmu(xsA) + c s xsA = 0, (A2)
where c s = θ Au′(xsA).
Proof : Differentiating (A2) and dropping superscripts, we have
dx˜B
dc
=
x˜B − xA − xA
ε
(
θm
θA
− 1
)
θmu′ (x˜B) − c .
The denominator being negative, we want to show that the numerator N
is positive. After some manipulations we obtain
N > 0 ⇔ x˜B
xA
>
θm − θA
εθA
+ 1.
From the concavity of u,
x˜B
xA
>
(
θm
θA
)1/ε
.
To achieve the proof, we only need to show that(
θm
θA
)1/ε
>
θm − θA
εθA
+ 1, ∀ε < 1.
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Observing that these two functions are decreasing with ε and equal when
ε = 1, this will be the case if the slope of (θ m/θ A)1/ε is lower than the
slope of (θ m − θ A)/εθ A + 1, that is if
− 1
ε2
ln
(
θm
θA
) (
θm
θA
)1/ε
< − 1
ε2
(
θm
θA
− 1
)
⇔ ln
(
θm
θA
) (
θm
θA
)1/ε
>
θm
θA
− 1.
As (θ m/θ A)1/ε > θ m/θ A, ∀ ε < 1, it is sufficient to show that
ln
(
θm
θA
)
θm
θA
>
θm
θA
− 1.
One can easily verify that x ln x > x − 1, ∀x > 0. Hence the result. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3.
Let us denote B˜l and B˜ the points (τ˜ lB, x˜
l
B) and (τ˜B, x˜B) respectively. Let us
also denote I˜m and I˜B the indifference curves for m and B through B˜. Finally,
denote I lB the indifference curve for B through B˜
l . These indifference curves
are represented on Figure A1.
We want to prove that B always prefers the policy B˜l to the policy B˜. B
may prefer B˜ to B˜l either because x˜lB is too low or too large. We know from
Lemma 3 that x˜lB > x˜B and thus that x˜
l
B is not too low. We now show that it is
Figure A1: The symmetric configuration with B wasting resources is not an equilibrium
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not too large either. Consider I˜B , the indifference curve for B through B˜. We
know from the fact that θ m ≤ θB that I˜B is flatter than I˜m at B˜. Moreover, I˜B
and I˜m cross only once, precisely at B˜. This implies that I˜B crosses the low cost
frontier to the right of the point where I˜m crosses the same frontier, which
occurs to the right of B˜l . Consequently, I˜B crosses the low cost frontier to the
right of B˜l so that I˜B lies below I lB . Hence the result.
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